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NO. 41 OCTOBER 2019 Introduction 
Strategic Foresight for Multilateral Policy 
Challenges, Opportunities and Success Factors 
Lars Brozus 
Increasingly, states are openly and assertively pursuing their national interests in 
international politics. The US, for instance, is revoking important international agree-
ments on disarmament, trade and climate change. Other countries with a claim to 
global power, such as China and Russia, are pursuing an aggressive territorial policy. 
The withdrawal of the UK from the European Union (EU) would mean the loss of an 
important partner, undermining its ability to implement a strategic and self-confi-
dent course of action at the international level. This is all the more worrying since 
any erosion of the rules-based international order requires a forward-looking and 
effective policy for shaping the future. Every time a binding international agreement 
is called into question or revoked, the threshold for uncoordinated unilateral action 
is lowered. Unexpected crises and conflicts might therefore occur more frequently in 
the future. Consequently, governments wanting to promote multilateralism should 
invest in joint strategic foresight. A multiperspective approach appears to be prom-
ising for identifying situations in which coordinated action with like-minded part-
ners offers opportunities to proactively shape international affairs. 
 
In response to the declining support for a 
rules-based international order, Germany, 
France and more than fifty other govern-
ments presented an “Alliance for Multilat-
eralism” at this year’s UN General Assem-
bly. The aim of the Alliance is to promote 
cooperation among its members in various 
policy areas. This cooperation is likely to be 
all the more fruitful and future-oriented if 
the partners succeed in bringing their dif-
ferent views, interests and preferences 
closer together with a view to tackling key 
challenges for the international community. 
Joint strategic foresight can support this 
convergence and could be tested within the 
framework of the Alliance. 
Tasks and Functions of 
Strategic Foresight 
The goal of strategic foresight is to alert 
political decision-makers at an early stage 
to possible events and developments for 
which options for action should be avail-
able in good time. It is effective when 
emerging crises and opportunities are 
recognised at a stage when there is still 
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sufficient time to take action which is likely 
to lead to success. 
Conceptually, the task is to identify events 
and developments that could become rele-
vant for international politics. In addition, 
decision-makers are made aware of options 
for action with which they can seize op-
portunities and respond to emerging crises. 
Strategic foresight thus serves two func-
tions: analysis and prescription. 
At the analytical level, a distinction can 
be made between forecasts and foresight. 
The former is aimed at anticipating specific 
events that could have an impact on inter-
national politics. These include unexpected 
changes of government or sudden military 
escalations in strategically important coun-
tries or regions, but also unannounced 
defaults by debtors that are considered too 
big to fail. 
Foresight, on the other hand, tries to 
track down longer-term trends. In addition, 
it analyses what interdependencies these 
trends could have across policy areas. This 
applies, for example, to technological in-
novations (e.g. cyberattacks as an uncon-
ventional military means or the role of 
social media manipulation in election cam-
paigns). Equally important is choosing and 
monitoring indicators that signal the stabil-
ity of a country or region, e.g. economic 
and demographic development, public 
satisfaction with political institutions, the 
extent of social inequality or changes in 
environmental conditions. Knowledge of 
the subject matter and country expertise 
are both included in the analysis. 
In prescriptive terms, the task is to draw 
conclusions for policy-making from the 
analytical findings. Firstly, the focus is on 
the question of what governments and par-
liaments should prepare for in the future 
and what resources and skills are needed 
to deal successfully with rather long-term 
challenges. Secondly, ideas and proposals 
are developed as to where and how deci-
sion-makers can intervene in the short term 
in order to seize on emerging opportunities 
or avoid crises. 
The Politics of Strategic Foresight 
Strategic foresight in international affairs 
has traditionally been a sovereign task that 
is performed within the framework of the 
nation-state. A look at the national level 
shows that most countries are a long way 
from a “whole of government” approach. 
As a rule, silo approaches dominate, which 
have their background in the different tasks 
and orientations of the responsible minis-
tries, but also in different organisational 
cultures. As a result, the analysis may typi-
cally contain “blind spots”. 
In Germany, the Federal Foreign Office 
(Auswärtiges Amt, AA), the Federal Ministry 
of Defence (Bundesministerium der Verteidi-
gung, BMVg) and the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusam-
menarbeit und Entwicklung, BMZ) are pri-
marily concerned with international affairs. 
In the Federal Government’s 2017 Guide-
lines, “Preventing Crises, Resolving Con-
flicts, Building Peace”, the three ministries 
agreed to improve coordination efforts with 
a view to identifying crises and conflicts at 
an early stage. They are therefore aware 
that it is problematic to practice strategic 
foresight in parallel and not in cooperation. 
Occasional initiatives by parliamentari-
ans indicate that the Bundestag also wants 
to make its foreign, development and secu-
rity policy work more strategic and forward-
looking. For example, information on pos-
sible and plausible strategic challenges 
could be provided on a regular basis at com-
mittee level. Expert hearings are also con-
ceivable. The political measures taken by 
the Federal Government to deal with such 
strategic challenges could be debated in 
plenary sessions. However, the priority for 
the Bundestag is to recognise crises and 
conflicts early on. 
The situation is similar for Germany’s 
most important international partners, 
such as the United Kingdom, France and 
the United States. Often, interinstitutional 
relations between the various government 
agencies that practice foresight are more 
competitive than cooperative. This also 
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applies to intergovernmental cooperation. 
Some governments occasionally develop 
joint foresight activities, for example, when 
German and French planning staff in their 
respective foreign ministries collaborate, 
though this rarely happens systematically. 
International and supranational actors 
such as the EU, NATO and the UN also have 
departments that work with foresight in 
mind. However, like many other actors, 
they focus their attention primarily on 
anticipating crises and conflicts. 
The Added Value of a 
Multilateral Approach 
Contrary to the practice of most foresight-
oriented institutions, there is nothing to say 
that strategic foresight cannot also indicate 
situations that herald a desirable outcome. 
A multilateral approach seems particularly 
suitable for detecting opportunities early 
on. Cooperation with partners from differ-
ent regions and cultures is particularly help-
ful in this respect because it can broaden 
and, at the same time, sharpen their view 
of global events and developments. This can 
help reduce the “blind spots” that occur 
with the conventional approaches: Firstly, 
the analysts’ inability to perceive events 
and developments that are beyond their 
imagination, which is shaped by their spe-
cific individual and collective background 
experiences and, secondly, the prioritisa-
tion of crises and conflicts in most foresight 
activities. Joint strategic foresight can ex-
pand the perception of weak signals among 
the noise of international affairs. It may 
also correct the fixation on negatively con-
notated events and developments. Decision-
makers can then be better sensitised to 
unexpected opportunities for action. 
Systematic cooperation between various 
partners brings different perspectives to-
gether. This does not meant there will not 
be any conflicting interests, however, 
understanding the views, interests and 
preferences of others actually occurs during 
the process, if the partners can agree on 
which thematic and geographical challenges 
to focus. Different perspectives thus com-
plement each other to form multiperspec-
tivity. This approach could be tested within 
the framework of the “Alliance for Multi-
lateralism”. If the approach proves success-
ful, one could consider how joint strategic 
foresight could be institutionalised across 
countries, for example in situation rooms. 
An additional goal would be to practice a 
cooperative process of policy-making and 
implementation. From an operational point 
of view, this facilitates rapid action in deci-
sion-making situations – an important 
prerequisite for effective multilateralism. 
In the reality of international politics, 
crises and opportunities often go hand in 
hand. A good example is the Arab Spring in 
2010/11. Mass protests were being held in 
practically the entire Middle East and North 
Africa. In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya they led 
to the replacement of those in power, while, 
in Syria, a civil war began that continues to 
this day. The popular uprisings were caused 
by deep dissatisfaction with living condi-
tions in the region, which were marked by 
corruption, lack of prospects and state re-
pression. For all the violence they resulted 
in (and in some cases still occurs today), 
they also offered an opportunity for regional 
transformation. It quickly became clear, 
however, that this would only be possible 
with massive external support – but no 
such plans were in place. As a result, the 
international response was essentially one 
of crisis management. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to learn from 
history: a common strategic vision might 
have allowed the EU, in particular, to devel-
op ideas at an early stage as to what meas-
ures it could take to bring about political, 
social and economic transformation in a 
more targeted and effective manner. Con-
flicts between the states involved in the 
foresight process over goals and measures 
would have been addressed early on and 
would have placed less of a burden on 
making decisions in a situation of ultimate 
uncertainty. 
However, even with a multiperspective 
approach it will not be possible to antici-
pate every revolutionary situation or emerg-
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ing opportunity for progressive transforma-
tion. The scientific evaluation of forecasting 
tournaments, on the other hand, shows 
that multiperspective teams perform better 
than more homogeneous reference groups. 
The “Good Judgment Project”, launched in 
2011, was aimed at answering questions 
about the occurrence of hypothetical events 
on the international level. In this five-year 
competition with more than 3,000 partici-
pants, laypersons achieved a greater degree 
of accuracy than experts or professional 
analysts – even though the latter had ac-
cess to information that was not publicly 
available. 
Diversity and Transparency as 
Success Factors 
Multiperspectivity does seem to pay off 
and would be a key requirement for cross-
nationally organised strategic foresight. In 
order for it to succeed, care must be taken 
to ensure that the analysis teams are not 
homogeneous, but rather represent a high 
degree of diversity. Key selection factors 
can be age, gender, ethnic, cultural and 
religious background as well as cognitive 
styles and political attitudes. 
In order to increase the diversity of per-
spectives, insights from non-state actors 
could be included in the analysis – often 
an important additional source of infor-
mation. However, “shrinking spaces” and 
state repression are not only a massive 
problem for civil society in increasing num-
bers of countries, but also for research 
activities. Field research under authoritarian 
conditions is becoming far riskier for 
scholars and their local sources; as a result 
reliable information on relevant develop-
ments is becoming more scarce. Govern-
ments wishing to pursue joint strategic 
foresight should therefore work to ensure 
that scientific research can take place under 
secure conditions. 
More quantitative data on global events 
and developments is available today than 
ever before. This makes it easier to build 
database-driven models for strategic fore-
casting that enable us to conduct complex 
and detailed analyses of countries and 
regions. At the same time, the opportuni-
ties for manipulating data and information 
have grown immensely. And these are not 
only exploited by authoritarian regimes. 
Within the framework of a joint strategic 
foresight, however, all the actors involved 
must be able to rely on the data not being 
unduly manipulated. Of course, trust be-
tween the partners is essential for exchang-
ing sensitive information. 
Transparency is also important to 
convince decision-makers to implement 
policies grounded in recommendations that 
are based on analyses of the future. Greater 
transparency could be achieved by intro-
ducing competitive elements and account-
ability to strategic foresight. The positive 
experience from forecasting competitions 
could help in this respect. 
The partners participating in the joint 
strategic foresight should organise such a 
forecast competition transnationally; this 
would make the objective comparatively 
easy to achieve: greater diversity and multi-
perspectivity with a view to recognising 
relevant events at an early stage. This could 
be a first step on the way to further joint 
foresight activities. 
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